OUR PHILOSOPHICAL HERITAGE

Post No. 10. The Sunday Evening Post, Nov. 29, 2009

By Neal Q. Herrick


While our form of government was shaped by crises, economics and political circumstances, it was also influenced by philosophers and the men who read their books. Some of our forefathers were among these readers and were determined to apply the theories of political philosophy to the formation of our government. We (and the inhabitants of many other countries) are indebted to our forefathers for their love of learning and for their ability to apply this learning to the creation of a new form of government: a government of, for and by the people. They wanted their creation to serve, to quote Hamilton in Federalist No. 9. as “the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent.” And it has served the world as a model. This essay comments briefly on the role of philosophy and, in particular, on the roles of Locke, Montesquieu and Bentham in helping our forefathers create the then unique government that “burst upon the world” (to borrow Lord Acton’s phrase) in 1791.

Mankind’s Political Dilemma

In order to survive, we humans must delegate some of our power to other humans. In return, these others (our civil officers) provide for our common defense and undertake those other tasks that we cannot accomplish individually. However, since power tends to corrupt, our civil officers tend to use the power we give them primarily for their own benefit rather than for ours. This is one of the basic dilemmas of human existence

In our times of hunting and wandering, we dealt with this dilemma by keeping a close eye on our tribal leaders. When they became too oppressive, we resorted to violence and put new leaders in their place. Where these revolutions were successful, we would live under the rule of our new leaders until they, in turn, became too oppressive and were overthrown. Under these arrangements, skilled and moderate leaders could remain in power for extended periods of time.

When we became more numerous and less nomadic, our leaders organized armies for our protection against other competitive tribes. Their control of these armies, unfortunately, also greatly increased their power over us. As they became more powerful, they became correspondingly more corrupt. We began to call them kings and, in order to rationalize their arbitrary and absolute power over our lives, imagined that they were descended from God and, therefore, had the divine right to oppress us (or not) as they choose.

The Age of Enlightenment and Our Revolution

Of course, many philosophies and many philosophers contributed to the intellectual climate of America in 1787. Locke, Montesquieu and Bentham seem to me to be especially relevant to the framing of our Constitution.

John Locke (1632-1704)

With the age of enlightenment, our attitude toward our relationship with our civil officers changed radically. For example, John Locke (1632-1704) attacked the idea that kings had a divine right to impose their will upon us. He argued, in The 2nd Treatise on Government, II, 6, that human beings have a natural “right to life, heath, liberty (and) possessions.” He also proposed a radical view of the purpose of government. “Political power,” he wrote, should be used “only for the public good.” Other philosophers of the period echoed Locke’s views and, gradually, ordinary people began to expect more from their leaders and from their lives.

These philosophical thoughts were necessary precursors to change. However, they left many questions to be answered. For example, how were the rights claimed by Locke to be secured on a continuing basis from both benevolent and non-benevolent leaders? Something more than a change in attitude was required. The next step was to imagine arrangements under which benevolent treatment might be secured as a right rather than as a privilege.

Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755)

Montesquieu conceived of a specific system aimed at accomplishing this desirable state of affairs. This was “a system in which different bodies exercised legislative, executive and judicial power, and in which all these bodies were bound by the rule of law” (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). His specific ideas about how to apply enlightenment principles came at a propitious time for us Americans. His concepts were embraced by James Madison (the “father” of our Constitution) and accepted by Madison’s fellow framers. Montesquieu posited three forms of government: the republic (which can be either democratic or aristocratic), the monarchy and the despotic government. The difference between a monarchy and a despotic government, according to Montesquieu, is that a monarch rules by law while a despot rule by his or her arbitrary will.

A Requisite Principle for Each Form of Government

Each form of government, said Montesquieu, has its own principle which must be cultivated in order to achieve success. The principle of a democratic republic is political virtue. The principle of aristocracy is moderation and the principle of monarchy is honor. The principle of despotism is fear. Montesquieu considered democracy’s need for political virtue to be a serious weakness. While the principles for aristocracy, monarchy and despotism are “natural” parts of human nature, the desire to be politically virtuous is not. It “requires a constant preference of public to private interest” (The Spirit of the Laws, 4.5) and “limits ambition to the sole desire, to the sole happiness, of doing greater services to our country than the rest of our fellow citizens” (The Spirit of the Laws, 5.3). In non-philosophical terms, “forget it.”

Remedies for the inherent weakness of our form of government

In order to remedy this weakness, democratic governments require a supply of virtuous civil officers. In order to supply this need, Montesquieu says, “the whole power of education is required” (Spirit of the Law, 4.5). Censorship is also needed in order to preserve self-renouncing values. Further, in a democracy, according to Montesquieu, frugality should be required by law and law should also preserve an equal distribution of property among citizens (SL 4.1).). Monarchies, on the other hand, have the advantage that “unlike the virtue required by democratic republics, the desire to win honor and distinction required by monarchies comes naturally

“Experience shows us.” wrote Montesquieu, “ that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it ... it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power" (SL 11.4).To this end, he proposed that the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of government be kept separate. Then, if one department attempts to abuse its powers, the others can check it. On the other hand, if one department holds al or several powers, there is nothing to prevent it from acting tyrannically.

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)

We should also be especially grateful to another, more recent, philosopher, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). He published his Fragments of Government in 1776, just eleven years before the framers met in Philadelphia. While Madison does not give Bentham the credit he gives Montesquieu, both the structure and the specific provisions of the Constitution seem to this citizen to reflect Bentham’s views of human nature. His utilitarian idea that “It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong” (A Fragment on Government, Preface) is certainly a pillar of our Constitution. After all, what is our Constitution but a set of structures and processes designed to give the greatest happiness to the greatest number of Americans?

These words of Bentham’s bear on the central difficulty faced by the framers as they set up a government “for the people:” how could they persuade its civil officers to use their power for the people’s benefit rather than for their own? He goes on to say, “ . . . the only consequences that men are at all interested in, what are they but pain and pleasure?” (AFOG, p. 11). Simply put, civil officers, being human, choose their courses of action according to the pleasure or pain they expect to experience as a result. In order to persuade our civil officers to avoid corruption of any kind, we must persuade them that honesty will result in more pleasure and less pain than will dishonesty. Montesquieu suggests placing them in situation where they would compete with each other for power, thus preventing any one department from becoming dominant Bentham suggests that the framers seek other ways to make the self-interests of civil officers consistent with the interests of the people. As Montesquieu implies, there are people whose nature leads them to maximize their pleasure and minimize their pain by placing the public good before their own. There are also, no doubt, benevolent dictators. However, it is wiser to assume that our civil officers will not be “angels” (as Madison put it in Federalist No. 51), In this way, Bentham advised the framers to devise as many constitutional provisions as possible to increase the pleasure civil officers could anticipate as a result of good behavior along with the pain they could expect as a result of choosing to behave corruptly..

Comment

The extent to which the framer’s were guided by Locke, Montesquieu and Bentham will be discussed in a later post, to be titled The Philosophical “Bones” of Our Constitution.